Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic (1971) by Ernst Badian

The nature of Roman imperialism, during both the Republic and Empire, has been endlessly debated.

In Badian’s view, the rise of Roman imperialism, an aggressive system marked by exploitation and annexation, can be best explained by looking at the weltanschaug of the Roman ruling class — the Senate. By the late Republic, he argues, the principles of the Senate were no longer guided by morality or virtue traditionally associated with that group. The quest for personal power was ushered in by Sulla, perfected by Pompey, and mastered by Caesar. The introduction of taxes made the returns on imperialism quite large, especially as administration, as by tradition, was quite limited. Social and political restraints had acted to reign in imperialism and exploitation by the Senate; by the late republic these restraints had gradually eroded, according to Badian. Sulla’s example was too strong and ultimately led to the “bankruptcy” of the aristocracy.

Badian uses the story of the outbreak of the First Mithridatic War (89 BC) as an example of the fundamental shift in the perception of the uses of empire. He claims that by this time the aristocratic elite had grown arrogant and greedy. They saw the kinds of wealth and glory a Roman governor could obtain in rich provinces. Moreover, the governors lived a more powerful existence than even a Roman consul, as they reigned totally supreme over their dominion. In the war against a Mithridates, the king of Asia Minor, the greed of Roman noble ultimately caused Rome to stumble into a major foreign war with a formidable power. The real significance, according to Badian, was that a Roman noble (Marcus Aquillus) made a blatant attempt to be enriched by a king while on official business as a negotiator, an affront he payed for with his life by having molten gold poured down his throat, surely one of the most symbolic and horrifying ways to go.

Badian writes that “no administration in history has ever devoted itself so whole heartedly to fleecing its subjects for the private benefit of the ruling class.” He uses the Scaptius affair as an illuminating example, where an elite with connections to Brutus was granted, via senatorial decree, legal exemptions from the lex Gabinia and legally dictated maximum interest rates. It was a disgraceful example of the extra legal rights bestowed to the old family Romans anytime economic opportunity was at issue.

By the late Republic opportunities for economic exploitation were deliberately sought and created, unlike the middle Republic when they had been merely a happy coincidence of securing Rome’s borders. This, to Badian, is the key difference between the mid- and late-Republican imperialism as exercised by the unquestioned foreign policy elites, the Senate. Pompey’s solutions, taxation without governing, were eagerly embraced.

In closing, Badian describes the Senate of the late Republic as a class of early “robber barons,” unshackled by traditional restraints on personal behavior and public policy on the pursuit of personal wealth through official action.