Jefferson Davis’s Generals (1999) by Gabor S. Boritt (Editor)

In the opening essay in this multi-authored book, Craig Symonds wonders aloud if there is an antonym for the word synergy, a particular combination of elements that make the whole greater than the sum of its parts. Symonds suggests that such a word, the opposite of synergy, would apply well to describing the relationship between Confederate president Jefferson Davis and General Joseph E. Johnston. After reading “Jefferson Davis’s Generals,” I would argue that the same word could be applied to this book.

To be sure, this slender volume, edited by Gabor Boritt, has many redeeming qualities. The aforementioned essay by Symonds on Johnston and his long, strained relationship with Davis is a good one, as is T. Michael Parrish’s contribution on General P.G.T. Beauregard. The capstone entry by James McPherson is clear and insightful, as always. However, the book suffers for lack of a cohesiveness and structure, which, I suppose, is to be expected in a collection of independent writing such as this. But the difference in style and focus and depth between the various essays makes it a jarring read. One is well advised to approach this volume as a collection of short papers on a broadly similar topic — executive civil-military relations in the Confederacy — rather than a book with a beginning, a middle and an end, which it most certainly is not.

The above critiques notwithstanding, I rather enjoyed “Jefferson Davis’s Generals,” particularly from the perspective of a case study in executive management. Davis assumed the role of commander in chief with seemingly remarkable qualifications for a wartime president — educated at West Point, combat veteran in both irregular (Blackhawk War) and conventional conflict (Mexican American War), and a former Secretary of War. In some ways, his experience reminded me of a newly minted CEO who has taken over a company that he knows well and now must balance oversight and direction, while cultivating a world class team of subordinates who are team players, but who are also independent and capable of making their own decisions. Indeed, the two most important jobs of a CEO are setting the strategic direction of the enterprise and selecting the key leaders to execute on the vision. Given that definition of responsibilities, how well did Jefferson Davis perform as CEO of the Confederacy?

On the first question, Confederate grand strategy, it seems that Davis performed reasonably well, embracing a offensive-defensive strategy that sought to achieve independence by delivering a knock-out blow to the Union Army somewhere in the decisive eastern theater. Many have argued that the South should have embraced a Fabian strategy, refusing battle but maintaining a powerful, mobile army with which to harass the larger Northern forces. In this model, the South would win by not losing. However, as McPherson persuasively argues here, the essence of the Confederacy as a confederation of sovereign and indepedent entities made such a strategy a political impossibility. In other words, Davis could not simply take all of the troops from the soverign state of Alabama and move them to a far away army while abandoning the state of Alabama to uncontested Union invasion. Emory Thomas argues that Davis and Lee were actually further apart in terms of their strategy for the war, with Davis more focused on the defensive side of the equation, while Lee remained fixed on the offensive, although McPherson claims that such an argument is overdrawn.

On the second point of identifying and promoting talented lieutenants, Davis’s record is more mixed. As McPherson writes, “Davis was thin-skinned and lacked Lincoln’s ability to work with critics for a common cause.” Whether or not the president liked you was likely to determine how far a general officer went in the Confederacy, with Braxton Bragg and John Bell Hood cited as the two prime examples of over promotion based on personal feelings. Meanwhile, there were those, like Johnston and Beauregard, whose relations with Davis were severely strained (both men wrote memoirs that excoriated their former command and chief), but also who suffered no shortage of failure and demonstrated questionable command decisions. Again, there were elements of these stories that reminded me of a CEO and his handling of division level general managers, where some are old golf buddies and their wives are friends, while others are much more distant or with personalities that simple don’t work well together.

All told, this is a great addition to any extensive Civil War library and provides a wide range of opinions on a fascinating subject in the history of the war. However, it does assume a certain level of familiarity with the subject and those new to the personalities and general timeline of the conflict may struggle to gain much of value.