Upton and the Army (1964) by Stephen E. Ambrose

I first read “Upton and the Army” in the mid-1990s when I worked in national security and defense circles. The US military was wrestling with the implications of a new “Revolution in Military Affairs,” a dramatic and discontinuous change in military capabilities wrought by the Information Age. In the post Cold War environment, serious military reform was all the rage. Suddenly, the long forgotten military reformer Emory Upton became relevant once again – and with him this gem of a book by Stephen Ambrose, first published in 1964.

Upton was born in the very liberal “Burnt Over” region of upstate New York. A devoted Methodist and committed abolitionist, he attended Oberlin College in preparation for West Point. He was remarkably ambitious and hardworking, according to Ambrose. He was socially ostracized at West Point for his liberal political views but graduated 8th of 45 in his class of 1861. He took a commission in the artillery, which offered the greatest opportunity for promotion.

Upton literally fired the first shot at Manassas and went on to serve extensively throughout the eastern theater, and then as a cavalry commander. He eventually rose from second lieutenant to brevet major general. Upton left the war behind him with the conviction that military policy in the US needed dramatic reform. His proposed reforms were both tactical and strategic in nature. I’ll focus this review solely on his strategic reforms to US military policy.

Upton spent 1876 on a War Department sponsored world tour. The end results were “The Armies of Asia and Europe” and “The Military Policy of the United States” – both calling for serious army reform.

In 1858, the Prussian General Albrecht von Roon proposed a list of sweeping reforms to modernize the Prussian Army, making it more professional and efficient. Upton aspired to be America’s Roon. In particular, he wanted to create an adequate reserve system to support a strong and, most importantly, professional army that was free from civilian control. The two chief impediments to implementing his reforms were the deep-rooted prejudices in favor of a minuteman style system of militia and the absence of any overriding national security threat to justify such a robust armed forces. Upton argued that America’s unpreparedness had cost countless dollars and lives in every war she fought. The unnecessarily long Civil War, he argued, was the consequence of a deficient military system that, if adequately organized beforehand, could have smashed the rebellion at First Bull Run. He also argued that the labor strikes of 1877, which were not contained by the militia, warranted a greater military force.

Upton’s main concerns had to do with civilian influence on the military. The militia was ineffective; politics and not merit determined promotions and the Secretary of War held too much authority over the operations of military campaigns, which Upton thought rightly belonged to the general-in-chief.

Civil War general Henry Halleck – a man who served as a constant guide, according to Ambrose – had already made many of Upton’s arguments. A committee on military reform chaired by Ambrose Burnside passed a broad list of reforms that followed Upton’s recommendations almost verbatim (i.e. creation of a general staff, interchangeable service between line and staff, and so on). “The Burnside Bill,” however, was defeated in 1879, a defeat that crushed Upton’s spirit.

By 1879, Ambrose says, Upton had lost his youthful zeal and optimism. He had become bitter and disillusioned. Moreover, for the first time he was beginning to doubt his own abilities. “Upton could not live with what he considered to be failure,” Ambrose writes. He shot himself in San Francisco on March 13, 1881.

After Upton’s death, the US Army slipped into the “Dark Ages,” according to the author. It had become a tired organization designed to fight an Indian threat that largely no longer existed and was completely incapable of fighting a major war. All of Upton’s warnings had been conveniently forgotten.

The American army that fought against the Spanish in 1898 was a miserable unit, Ambrose says – but luckily the enemy was even worse. The inefficiencies of the armed services were apparent to astute observers. Secretary of War Russell Alger was fired because of it and was replaced by the highly competent Elihu Root. During the course of investigating the problems afflicting the army, Root discovered and became a disciple of Upton’s. Root’s subsequent military reforms contained most of Upton’s specific proposals, including an enlarged federal army, closer federal supervision over the National Guard, more advanced education for army officers, interchangeable service between staff and line assignments and the establishment of a general staff. The military was still controlled by civilians, but overall Upton and his ideas had been vindicated.

In 1904, the War Department published Upton’s “The Military Policy of the United States” after making only minor edits. In the end, Upton had succeeded in creating a modern US military system. He was America’s von Roon after all.